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Dombase: söktermen subject='todisteet' gav 5 träffar


[1 / 5]

Date when decision was rendered: 22.12.2000

Judicial body: Rovaniemi Court of Appeal = Rovaniemi hovrätt = Rovaniemen hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 883; R00/643

Reference to source

RHO 5:2001.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, right to examine witnesses, evidence,
rättvis rättegång, rätt att förhöra vittnen, bevis,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, oikeus kuulustella todistajia, todisteet,

Relevant legal provisions

ECHR-6

Abstract

B had escaped from prison and robbed a bank.He was convicted in the court of first instance together with another person who had driven the get-away car in the robbery.The case went further to the court of appeal.During the proceedings before the court of appeal, B continued to deny his guilt.He pointed out that the bank clerks or witnesses had not identified him as the robber.A videotape from the bank's surveillance camera had been presented as evidence in the court of first instance.Some of the witnesses had identified B on the basis of the tape.However, B claimed that such identification could not be considered reliable.Some of the witnesses were guards at the prison from which B had escaped.B considered their testimonies as being biased, prejudiced, second-hand evidence which was against the spirit of the ECHR.

The court of appeal noted that four witnesses had with certainty identified B from the videotape by his features, bearing and walk.Although the bank clerks had not identified B as the robber, their observations supported the evidence given by other witnesses.During the police investigation, the videotape had been shown to the guards who acted as witnesses.The guards had been heard by the police one at a time.They had been chosen at random, except for one, C, who was a foreman at the place where B had worked while in prison.Prior to the police investigation, C had learned that B was to be identified from the videotape while the other guards who acted as witnesses did not know who they were supposed to identify from the tape.According to the court of appeal, this reduced the value of C's testimony.However, the identification made by the three other guards could be regarded as reliable.All the witnesses had been heard before the court of first instance and the court of appeal in the presence of the defendants, which thus had a possibility to examine or have examined the witnesses.The court of appeal concluded that the requirements of a fair trial had not been infringed.

30.10.2002 / 30.5.2006 / RHANSKI


[2 / 5]

Date when decision was rendered: 31.12.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3529; 2081/3/02

Reference to source

KHO 2003:103.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2003 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2003 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2003 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2007

Pages: pp. 662-667

Subject

respect for private life, respect for family life, evidence,
respekt för privatliv, respekt för familjeliv, bevis,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, perhe-elämän kunnioittaminen, todisteet,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 1a and 16-5 of the Aliens Act; section 15-1 of the Administrative Procedure Act

= utlänningslag 1a § och 16 § 5 mom.; lag om förvaltningsförfarande 15 § 1 mom.

= ulkomaalaislaki 1a § ja 16 § 5 mom.; hallintomenettelylaki 15 § 1 mom.

ECHR-8

Abstract

The Directorate of Immigration had rejected A's application for a permanent residence permit on the grounds that there had been no genuine family life between A and A's Finnish spouse or that their family life had ended at the early stage of their marriage and before A had resided in Finland for two years.The administrative court did not change the decision.The Directorate of Immigration and the administrative court based their decisions on a police investigation report concerning A's family life.A was given the opportunity to read her own statement after the police investigation but could see the statements made by other witnesses only after the Directorate of Immigration had already made its decision.The administrative court had rejected A's request for an oral hearing.The Supreme Administrative Court held that there had been a procedural fault.A had not been given the opportunity to comment on evidence that had affected the decision, as required by section 15-1 of the Administrative Procedure Act.The case was returned to the Directorate of Immigration for a new consideration.In its decision the administrative court held that the decision of the Directorate of Immigration did not violate A's right to private and family life as provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR.The Supreme Administrative Court did not refer to specific human rights provisions.

21.4.2004 / 3.7.2009 / RHANSKI


[3 / 5]

Date when decision was rendered: 23.9.2004

Judicial body: Kouvola Court of Appeal = Kouvola hovrätt = Kouvolan hovioikeus

Reference: Report no. R04/493

Reference to source

KouHO 2004:5.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, evidence,
rättvis rättegång, bevis,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, todisteet,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 5a, section 13 of the Coercive Measures Act

= tvångsmedelslagen 5a kapitel 13 §

= pakkokeinolaki 5a luku 13 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

The defendants A, B and C argued before the court of appeal that recordings of A's telephone conversations, which had been received through telecommunications interception authorised by a court on account of A being suspected of an aggravated narcotics offence, could not be used as evidence in certain other counts in the indictment which did not concern the suspected narcotics offence.

The court of appeal ruled that the Coercive Measures Act does not explicitly prohibit the use of extraneous information which has been obtained through legitimate telecommunications interception but does not pertain to the offence for which the authorisation to listen and record telemessages was granted.A court may on a case-by-case basis consider the admissibility of such evidence, taking into account the values and goals protected by declaring the evidence inadmissible, the requirements of a fair trial, the significance of the evidence as well as the pursuit of finding out the substantive truth.The court of appeal referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, mentioning the Schenk case as an example (judgment of 12 July 1988, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, vol. 140).It found that the case law of the human rights court left open the question as to the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal procedure.The decisive factor has been that the trial as a whole is fair.In this case, the recording of the telemessages had been authorised by a court.Although it had not been demanded that A should be convicted of an aggravated narcotics offence, the other counts in the indictment concerned serious offences which were connected with the suspected aggravated narcotics offence.The recordings were not the only evidence in support of these other counts in the indictment, their authenticity had not been challenged, they did not involve third parties and, moreover, A had himself referred to the recordings as his own evidence.The court of appeal rejected the claim and admitted the recordings as evidence.The decision is final as the Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal (decision no. 1068 of 27 April 2005).

30.5.2006 / 30.5.2006 / RHANSKI


[4 / 5]

Date when decision was rendered: 19.6.2007

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 1336; R2006/294

Reference to source

KKO 2007:58.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2007 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2007 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2007 II tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2007

Pages: pp. 328-337

Subject

respect for private life, evidence, fair trial,
respekt för privatliv, bevis, rättvis rättegång,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, todisteet, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti,

Relevant legal provisions

chapter 5a, sections 4 and 13 of the Coercive Measures Act; chapter 17, section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 10 of the Constitution Act

= tvångsmedelslag 5a kapitel 4 § och 13 §; rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 2 §; grundlagen 10 §

= pakkokeinolaki 5a luku 4 § ja 13 §; oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 2 §; perustuslaki 10 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

X and some other members of a motorcycle club were suspected of aggravated narcotics offences.The court of first instance had granted the police authorisation for technical listening of the suspects in the club's premises.On X's complaint, the court of appeal later quashed the authorisation as far as X was concerned.The Supreme Court upheld the appeal court's decision, having found that no sufficient grounds had been presented to show that X could have been suspected of aggravated narcotics offences.However, through its technical listening, the police also obtained information which gave cause to suspect X of harbouring an offender by having destroyed evidence of homicide.X was charged accordingly, and the recording obtained through technical listening was presented as evidence.The court of first instance ruled the recording inadmissible, on the grounds that the authorisation for technical listening had not been and could not be granted for the purposes of investigating an offence of harbouring an offender.The court of appeal again allowed the evidence, because the information on the CD recording had nevertheless been obtained lawfully by the police.The case proceeded to the Supreme Court which considered two main questions: whether the recording introduced as evidence had been obtained lawfully and what was the significance of the fact that the authorisation for technical listening covered aggravated narcotics offences but not the offence of harbouring an offender.

The Supreme Court noted that the fact that evidence has been obtained by illegal means does not necessarily mean that it is inadmissible.The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that unlawfully obtained evidence is not as such in violation of Article 6 of the ECHR, provided the proceedings as a whole are fair (Schenk v.Switzerland, judgment of 12 July 1988, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, no. 140; Khan v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 12 May 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-V).However, evidence which has been obtained in serious violation of the law may be excluded on a case-by-case basis.The Supreme Court continued that, in Finnish law, there is no provision which would prevent the use of evidence obtained through technical listening solely on the grounds that the authorisation for technical listening has later been quashed on the basis of a complaint.The Supreme Court found that there were no indications that any serious violations of the law would have occurred when the authorisation was granted.The technical listening had been carried out while the authorisation was in force.In the Supreme Court's view, the fact that the authorisation had later been quashed was not decisive when assessing the lawfulness of the activities of the authorities.Considering also the grounds for quashing the authorisation, the Supreme Court concluded that the recording had as such been obtained lawfully.

The Supreme Court then referred to the Coercive Measures Act which contains a provision concerning extraneuos information which is obtained by technical listening but pertains to an offence other than that for which the authorisation for technical listening was granted.The Act does not explicitly prohibit the use of extraneous information as evidence.A court may exclude such evidence on a case-by-case basis.The Court reasoned that in this case, the purpose for declaring the recording inadmissible would be the protection of the right to private life.On the other hand, the case was concerning an offence which is punishable by imprisonment and the recording was a significant piece of evidence in establishing the facts of the case.Admittedly, the authorisation for technical listening did not cover the offence of harbouring an offender.On the other hand, it specifically allowed that X is subjected to technical listening while in the club's premises.In conclusion, the Supreme Court declared the recording admissible in evidence.In the Court's view, using the recording as evidence would not jeopardize X's right to a fair trial, because he would have the opportunity to challenge the value of the recording as evidence and to have witnesses examined with regard to the evidence.

5.5.2010 / 10.3.2017 / RHANSKI


[5 / 5]

Date when decision was rendered: 9.3.2011

Judicial body: Kuopio Administrative Court = Kuopio förvaltningsdomstol = Kuopion hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 11/0113/7

Reference to source

Electronic database for administrative court decisions within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för beslut av förvaltningsdomstolar inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin hallinto-oikeuksien päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

right to the inviolability of the home, evidence, fair trial,
rätt till hemmets okränkbarhet, bevis, rättvis rättegång,
kotirauhan suoja, todisteet, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 2-1, 7-1, 10, 35 and 37 of the Act on State Television and Radio Fund; sections 10 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om statens televisions- och radiofond 2 § 1 punkten, 7 § 1 mom., 10 §, 35 § och 37 §; grundlagen 10 § och 22 §

= laki valtion televisio- ja radiorahastosta 2 § 1 kohta, 7 § 1 mom., 10 §, 35 § ja 37 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 22 §

Abstract

The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) had ordered Z to pay a statutory inspection fee of EUR 100, because Z allegedly owned a television set but had not paid a television fee.In general, television license inspectors do not enter a household without the permission of the resident.In his appeal, Z claimed that the inspector, who had reported to have seen a television set in Z's living room, had entered the apartment through an open door while Z was away.Z presented as evidence photographs which showed that the living room was not visible from the front door of the apartment.On the basis of the photographs, the administrative court concluded that the inspector's observations could not be correct.FICORA had thus no grounds for the decision to order the inspection fee.With reference to the constitutional right to the inviolability of the home, the court continued that if the inspector had entered the apartment in Z's absence, he/she had used illegal means to obtain evidence.In that case, FICORA's decision on the inspection fee was based solely on evidence which had been obtained in violation of Z's fundamental right.Therefore, the decision was in clear contradiction with the constitutional duty of public authorities to guarantee the observation of human rights as well as the principle of fair trial, and the inspector's report could not form the grounds for ordering the payment of the inspection fee.The administrative court quashed FICORA's decision.

11.10.2012 / 11.10.2012 / RHANSKI